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Abstract
This paper studies three related questions: To what extent otherwise similar
startups employ di¤erent quantities and qualities of human capital at the moment
of entry? How persistent are initial human capital choices over time? And how
does deviating from human capital benchmarks inuence rm survival? The
analysis is based on a matched employer-employee dataset and covers about 17,500
startups in manufacturing and services. We adopt a new procedure to estimate
individual benchmarks for the quantity and quality of initial human resources,
acknowledging correlations between hiring decisions, founders human capital,
and the ownership structure of startups (solo entrepreneurs versus entrepreneurial
teams). We then study the survival implications of exogenous deviations from
these benchmarks, based on spline models for survival data. Our results indicate
that (especially negative) deviations from the benchmark can be substantial, are
persistent over time, and hinder the survival of rms. The implications may,
however, vary according to the sector and the ownership structure at entry. Given
the stickiness of initial choices, wrong human capital decisions at entry turn out
to be a close to irreversible matter with signicant survival penalties.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses three related questions: To what extent do otherwise similar startups
employ di¤erent quantities and qualities of human capital at the moment of entry? How
likely are deviating initial human capital choices adapted at a later stage? And how does
deviating from the benchmark inuence rm survival? The main objective of our study is to
measure the causal impact of entering with di¤erent levels of quality and quantity of human
resources (HR) compared to a benchmark of identical rms, with identical owners. To this
end, we have to obtain reliable estimates of individual benchmark levels of the quality and
quantity of personnel at startup, which are determined by observed and unobserved individ-
ual, rm, and industry characteristics of each startup. Deviations from these benchmarks
are considered exogenous and may relate to forecasting errors or random factors, allowing
us to estimate the e¤ect of interest.1
The quantity and quality of HR at entry, namely startup size and (the owners and
workers) human capital, has been widely shown to matter for the performance of new
ventures (Bates, 1990; Feeser and Willard, 1990; Cooper et al, 1994; Agarwal and Audretsch,
2001; Geroski et al., 2010). There is, however, a great heterogeneity in the initial workforce
employed by new rms, even within narrowly dened industries, regions, and startup years.2
Some rms enter with a larger and/or more skilled workforce than close competitors,
possibly due to entrepreneursrelatively higher skills, better nancial conditions, overcon-
dence, or risk-taking preferences (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Koellinger et al., 2007; Katila
et al., 2012; Åstebro et al., 2014). In contrast, many entrepreneurs are not able to match the
competitorsHR choices, either due to nancial and/or ability constraints, forecasting errors
regarding the expected market demand and competition, or risk aversion (e.g., Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1994; Cressy, 1996; Cabral and Mata, 2003; Hyytinen et al., 2014), just to name a
few potential reasons. Alternative explanations rely on the seminal models of learning by
doing of Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998). Many rms may actually decide
to enter at sub-optimal positions and to experience a (hopefully temporary) comparative
disadvantage, in order to have the opportunity to learn about themselves and expand later,
if successful (Audretsh and Acs, 1990; Audretsch et al., 1999; Santerelli and Vivarelli, 2007).
The long-term associations between startup conditions and the survival of new ventures
(e.g., Geroski et al., 2010), and the stickiness of most initial decisions  including those
related to HR (Hamermash and Pfann, 1996; Gilbert, 2005; Agarwal et al, 2009) suggest,
1Random variations in capital constraints, such as winning the lottery, may also be included in such
random factors.
2See, for instance, Mata and Machado (1996), Cabral and Mata (2003), and Agarwal and Audretsch
(2001) for evidence on startup size heterogeneity, and Haltiwanger et al. (1999, 2007) for evidence on the
heterogeneity in workforce composition, even within narrow groups of rms.
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however, that sub-optimal positions may be really di¢ cult to correct later on. If that is the
case, learning attempts by rms deliberately entering with inferior positions may be costly.
Though we nd in the literature valuable discussions about how important is for new
rms to match the so-called minimum e¢ cient scale of the industry (e.g., Audretsh and
Acs, 1990; Audretsch et al., 1999, 2000), the available evidence is restricted to startup size
decisions in the manufacturing industry. A comparison between manufacturing and services
rms may provide relevant insights about the importance of deviating from human capital
benchmarks in industries with di¤erent entry barriers and capital requirements. We still
lack comprehensive analyses of both human capital quantity and quality decisions at entry,
comparing startups in both manufacturing and services.
Few studies have attempted to measure a causal impact of these decisions at entry on
survival, which is obviously no sine cure. Most studies have disregarded the heterogeneity
of the human capital of the entrepreneurs themselves founding these new ventures. They
may be heterogeneous in their education levels, experience, and (unobserved) skills, which
may of course inuence their HR decisions at entry. Moreover not all entrepreneurs run
their business alone. Some of them enter in teams, which may also have implications on
human capital choices.
In view of that, using the human capital choices of competitors in the same industry
as a benchmark may be limiting, since it neglects the heterogeneity caused by the size of
the founding team (solo or team) and the human capital of the entrepreneurs themselves.
Because we want to mimic, as much as possible, random variations in startup size and
workforce quality to obtain unbiased impact estimates on survival, we use a new approach
to estimate the human capital benchmarks for each new venture under analysis. We estimate
benchmarks for both the number of employees at startup and the employeesaverage skill
level at entry. We then analyze how startups deviate from these individual benchmarks, and
how that matters for their survival prospects. Thus, our approach takes into account that
HR choices at entry are endogenous and possibly co-determined by observed and unobserved
characteristics of the entrepreneur.
The study is based on matched employer-employee data for Portugal, and covers 17,579
startups entering the private sector during the period 1992-2007. All ventures are started
by people who had been employees just before becoming business owners (BOs), and each
venture employs at least one employee at entry. In this way, we try to study opportu-
nity entrepreneurship of BOs for whom decisions about HR management are relevant. The
analysis furthermore compares di¤erent startups according to the sector they enter (man-
ufacturing versus services) and their initial ownership structure (solo entrepreneurs versus
entrepreneurial teams).
The paper is structured as follows. Next section briey frames the paper into the litera-
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ture. Section 3 starts by presenting the data and the sample. It then explains the methods
used to measure individualsskills and to estimate human capital benchmarks. Section 4
provides some descriptive statistics on startup conditions and deviations from the estimated
benchmarks by groups of rms. It also demonstrates how persistent initial decisions about
the size and quality of the workforce are. Section 5 discusses the empirical results for the
relationship between deviations from human capital benchmarks and rm hazard. Section
6 concludes.
2 Human capital choices at entry and the dynamics of
new ventures
Relative positions are often more of a concern among individuals than absolute positions
(Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Alpizar et al., 2005). The same may be true among rms.
The relative position of startup rms in terms of their initial human capital quantity and
quality may encompass strategic decisions and/or signal entrepreneurs constraints, risk
preferences, or biased expectations.
Startup size was early understood as a key strategic decision for entrepreneurs (Birley and
Westhead, 1994; Audretsch et al., 1999). Part of this decision could simply be understood
as a choice between a higher risk/reward larger scale startup versus a lower risk/reward
smaller scale startup. Entry size choices may also be explained by founderscharacteristics,
namely their ability or entrepreneurial talent and, partly as a consequence, cash constraints
(Cabral and Mata, 2003; Parker and van Praag, 2006). More skilled entrepreneurs may
su¤er fewer nancial restrictions and may have higher levels of self-condence. They may
be, therefore, more prone to take risks, more able to run a larger venture, and more likely
to be able to pay the costs necessary to start at a larger scale (Mata and Machado, 1996;
Cabral and Mata, 2003; Colombo et al., 2004). Entrepreneurs may, independent from their
ability levels, also be overcondent in their own abilities and future chances of success. This
may also lead to larger startups, all else equal (Bolger et al., 2008; Katila et al., 2012;
Åstebro et al., 2014; Hyytinen et al., 2014). Other behavioral biases, such as overoptimism
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Hmieleski and Baron, 2009), or lower levels of loss aversion
(Koudstaal et al., 2015) might have a similar impact on startup size.
On the contrary, those who do not reach the size benchmarks are more likely to corre-
spond to nancially constrained (Cabral and Mata, 2003) and/or less talented entrepreneurs
(Lucas, 1978), risk averse entrepreneurs (e.g., Hvide and Panos, 2014), or people who have
a strong preference for autonomy (Benz and Frey, 2008). Another explanation for startups
entering at a sub-optimal scale is the entrepreneursexpectations of learning by doing (Jo-
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vanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1998). Many entrepreneurs are actually uncertain about
their ability and e¢ ciency, so they may decide to enter at a small scale, relying on the
expectation that they will be able to correct their entry decision later on and grow, as they
update their beliefs about their ability and e¢ ciency (Audretsch and Acs, 1990; Audretsch
et al., 1999, 2000).
All these arguments can be used to explain the heterogeneity found in workforce size even
among startups in the same industry, region, or cohorts. The same arguments will apply
when discussing heterogeneity in the composition of the workforce in terms of the quality
of employees (e.g., their education, experience, and skills) (Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007).
In addition, for quality, there is also evidence of a positive hierarchical sorting by ability
in rms, which means that there might be complementarities between workersskills and
those of their superiors (Garicano and Hubbard, 2005; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006)
who, in micro and small startup rms, often correspond to business founders. More recent
evidence based on matched employer-employee data for Portugal also conrms that more
skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to attract more skilled workers and to pay higher wages
on average (Baptista et al., 2013). Thus, the more skilled entrepreneurs may be more likely
to match or even surpass the average human capital quality hired by closer competitors,
while the less skilled (who may also correspond to the most nancially constrained) may
have a harder time matching human capital quality benchmarks.
We have argued (and will test) that entrepreneurs may make a variety of decisions about
the quantity and quality of personnel hired at entry. Our second argument (and test) will
be that initial positions may be sticky and hard to correct over time, for instance due to
rm structural inertia (Gilbert, 2005), labor market rigidities, and consequent adjustment
costs (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Therefore, deviating from the benchmark quantity and
quality of human capital at the moment of entry may be rather persistent. Even if some
adjustments in initial hiring decisions can be made later on, startup conditions may become
imprinted in the rm and have even stronger e¤ects on survival than current conditions
(e.g., Geroski et al. 2010). The stickiness of initial positions might enlarge the consequences
of deviations from the benchmark in terms of later outcomes, such as rm survival. Our
third argument (and test) concerns the potential survival consequences of initial personnel
decisions in startups.
The non-randomness of human capital decisions hinders the unbiased measurement of
the e¤ect of (deviating) initial HR choices on rm survival. In view of this, and to measure
this e¤ect, we pull all these observed and unobserved heterogeneities across rms and entre-
preneurs and their combinations together in a benchmark that is dened for each individual
entrepreneur. The remaining deviation from this benchmark can be considered random, al-
lowing us to measure the unbiased e¤ect of HR decisions on survival. We must, however, be
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aware that benchmark human capital levels are not necessarily the optimal levels, but rather
the expected levels according to all these aforementioned heterogeneities and correlations.3
The relationship between human capital deviations and rm hazard may be quite com-
plex and potentially di¤erent for particular groups of startups. For instance, economies of
scale are undoubtedly more important in manufacturing industries than in services, so the
(in)ability to (reach) exceed the startup size benchmark may have di¤erent implications for
rm survival according to the sector. Deviations from the benchmark quality of the workers
hired at entry may also have di¤erent consequences according to the degree of complemen-
tarity between rms capital intensity and human capital quality. Positive and negative
deviations may have distinct consequences. Deviations from benchmark size and skill levels
at the moment of entry may have heterogeneous e¤ects on new venture survival according to
several (yet unknown) factors. While answering our three questions we distinguish between
solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams operating in manufacturing and services.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data and sample
Our data come fromQuadros de Pessoal (hereafter, QP), a large longitudinal linked employer-
employee dataset collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. QP covers all rms
operating in the Portuguese private sector and employing at least one wage earner. Avail-
able information at the rm-level includes employment, sales, industry, ownership, location,
among others. At the individual-level, QP reports information about each workers age,
education, gender, qualications, wages, occupational category, tenure, number of hours
worked, and type of contract. All rms, establishments and workers are identied with a
unique identication number, so they can be followed and matched over time. Raw QP les
are available for the period 1986-2009.4
Entries of new rms are identied by the rst year a rm is recorded in QP les. Our
analysis is based on startup rms entering in t, either in manufacturing industries or in
3Though the literature often refers to sub-optimal positions (and namely sub-optimal scales), it is hard
(if not impossible) to measure the optimal quantity and quality of human capital. It varies according to
the industry, the macroeconomic environment, the characteristics of rms and entrepreneurs active in the
market, among other factors. However, by studying the consequences of deviating from the benchmark, we
may get some insights about how close might be these benchmarks to the so-called optimal levels. If rms
minimize their hazard by entering with the benchmark quantity and quality of human capital, then the
benchmarks may be close to the optimal choices. If, instead, rms can get some survival bonus by deviating
above (below) the benchmark, it may suggest that benchmark human capital choices are sub-optimal (over-
optimal).
4There is a gap for the particular years of 1990 and 2001 in the worker-level les, for which no information
was gathered at the individual-level.
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services, whose founder(s) was/were in paid employment in t  1 or t  2. We exclude those
startup rms founded by individuals who left their job in t  1 or t  2 in a rm that either
closed down or su¤ered a massive downsizing in the same year, which would be closer to
necessity-driven startup rms. Initial HR choices may be more constrained for this group of
individuals. For the same reason, we also exclude startup rms whose founder(s) was (were)
never observed in the QP les before, or who were absent for long periods of time (i.e., three
or more years), as in these cases we are not able to accurately identify the reason for their
absence in the les  they may have been unemployed, self-employed without employees,
inactive, or temporarily in the public sector. As their previous status in the labor market
(which is unobserved) may be correlated with their startup conditions in terms of human
capital, we leave them out of the current analysis.
Hence, our nal sample is composed of all the startup rms entering between 1992 and
2007 (excluding 2001), employing at least one wage earner at the moment of startup, and
for which we can identify the business owner(s) (BOs) at entry, who must come from paid
employment.5 In other words, we base our analysis on entrepreneurs that are potentially
meaningful, i.e., entrepreneurs who do not enter to escape from unemployment (Reynolds et
al., 2002) and who do not have intentions to always remain own account workers. Instead,
these entrepreneurs are likely to have higher ambition levels and to have high impact in
the economy (Levine and Rubinstein, 2013; Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014). They are,
therefore, relatively unconstrained and are more likely to have a choice about the quantity
and quality of human capital they wish to employ at entry.
Data for the years 1986-1991 were only used to trace and characterize the experience of
these BOs in the labor market. A total of 17,579 startup rms with complete information
on the key variables of interest fulll these conditions. About 22% of these rms operate
in manufacturing industries, and more than half of them are founded by a solo entrepre-
neur. Table A.I in the Appendix presents the distribution of solo entrepreneursand teams
startups across 2-digit industries.
We analyzed the survival of these rms until the end of the period observed or until
the moment of an eventual ownership change (depending on which of the options occurs
rst).6 The analysis stops in 2007, the last year for which we can accurately identify the
exit of rms. Firm exit is identied by the moment when a rm ceases to answer the survey.
Following previous studies that also use QP dataset (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 2002; Geroski
5Due to the missing data at the worker-level for 2001, we are not able to identify the founder of rms
entering during that year, so entries occurring in 2001 had to be excluded.
6About 40% of the rms in our sample su¤er changes in the entrepreneurial team founding the rm. After
ownership changes, the business is no longer the same, as the entrepreneur-rm match may also change. It
is not however our aim in this paper to study what explains these processes of ownership change, neither
their impacts. For this reason, we censor the spells at the point of ownership change. We conduct some
robustness checks to conrm that our results are not a¤ected by this procedure.
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et al., 2010), we have required an absence of the rm from the les larger or equal to two
years in order to identify its denite exit. For this reason, data for 2008 and 2009 were only
used to check the presence or absence of rms in QP les.
3.2 Measuring individualsskills
Previous studies have recognized that nding the right measure of skills is not easy (Iranzo
et al., 2008). Most of the existing studies constructed human capital proxies based on ob-
served dimensions such as workerseducational attainment, age, earnings, or gender (e.g.,
Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007; Ilmakunnas et al., 2004), thereby disregarding unobserved
di¤erences such as innate ability or informal skills (see also Iranzo et al, 2008; Martins,
2008). However, Abowd et al. (1999) show that observed levels of workers skill hetero-
geneity imperfectly reect the true level of heterogeneity, which also includes an unobserved
component at the individual-level.
For this reason, we use the multi-dimensional skill index developed by Portela (2001) to
measure workersand BOsskills. Following most of the earlier literature, this measure is
originally based on individualseducation (namely the number of schooling years attained
by each person at each year). Besides this human capital dimension, the skill index for each
individual is then adjusted in order to take into account her experience (age) and unobserved
permanent heterogeneity (which includes, among others, innate ability, informal skills, and
education quality) relative to other comparable individuals in the population.7 Individuals
unobserved skills are measured using xed e¤ects estimation.
Formally, the skill index of each individual i in each year t is computed as follows:
Sit = mschool  aschool  aexperience  aunobserved ability (1)
wheremschool is the average schooling years in the economy in each year. In other words,
we rst assume that each individual enters the labor market with the average education of
the active population in that year, to then correct the index in order to take into account
the actual position of each individual, in each year, in the schooling distribution. This
correction is performed by multiplying mschool by the following correction factor:
aschool = 0:5 +
exp((schooli  mschool)=sschool)
1 + exp((schooli  mschool)=sschool) (2)
7This multi-dimensional skill index has also inspired other authors to construct new and better quality
measures in other contexts. Sá et al. (2004, 2012) use a similar index inspired on Portelas skill index to
construct a composite measure of universities education quality in The Netherlands. This index allows
them to take into account di¤erent university attributes, as well as the relative position of each university
in each attribute.
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where schooli is the schooling level (in years) of worker i and sschool represents the
standard deviation of schooling in the population. This correction factor takes values be-
tween 0:5 and 1:5, which intuitively means that individuals more (less) educated than the
average will have a multiplicative correction factor larger (smaller) than 1.
At this stage, we have a standard human capital measure at the individual-level simply
based on their education. However, even if we compare individuals with the same education,
we still nd a great heterogeneity among them for instance, in terms of experience. In
order to correct for this source of observed heterogeneity, we multiply the skill index of
each individual by this second correction factor aexperience , which allows to adjust the skill
measure of each individual either upwards or downwards, according to her relative position
in the age distribution of the individuals with similar education attainment. This correction
term is computed as follows:
aexperience = 0:5 +
exp((agei  magejschooli)=(sagejschooli))
1 + exp((agei  magejschooli)=(sagejschooli)) (3)
where agei is the age (in years) of worker i, magejschooli is the average age of the
population within schooling level schooli, and sagejschooli is its standard deviation. Again,
individuals more (less) experienced than the average of individuals with the same level of
education will have a multiplicative correction factor larger (smaller) than 1.8
As we are aware that two individuals with precisely the same education level and age
may still be very di¤erent in their skills and productivity potential, we furthermore correct
this skill index in order to take into account individualsxed e¤ect, as a proxy for their
unobserved and permanent productivity di¤erential. In order to estimate the person xed
e¤ect, we separately estimated a two high-dimensional xed-e¤ects wage equation using the
procedure described in Guimarães and Portugal (2010), based on all the history we have for
each individual in wage employment. The dependent variable was dened as the real hourly
earnings (in logs).9 This wage equation controlled for individuals age (and its square),
tenure (and its square), education, qualications, year dummies, and, following Abowd et
al. (1999), both worker and rm unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity. This allowed us to
estimate the worker-specic e¤ect (FEi), which basically reects the income the individual
earns on top of or below what is expected, based on all her observed characteristics and
taking into account the xed e¤ect of the respective rm. This was then introduced in the
nal correction factor of the skill index, computed as follows:
8The several human capital dimensions enter this index multiplicatively because they are assumed to be
complementary.
9Hourly earnings correspond to the ratio between total regular payroll (base wages and regular benets)
and the total number of normal hours worked in the reference period. Earnings were deated using the
Consumer Price Index. Outliers (i.e., the 1% with highest and lowest real hourly log earnings in each year)
were removed from the estimations.
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aunobserved ability = 0:5 +
exp((FEi  mFEjschooli; agei)=(sFEjschooli; agei))
1 + exp((FEi  mFEjschooli; agei)=(sFEjschooli; agei)) (4)
where mFEjschooli; agei denotes the average of worker xed e¤ects for individuals with
the same schooling and age, and sFEjschooli; agei is the standard deviation of those e¤ects.
We now have a skill measure that allows two individuals with the same education level
and age to be treated as potentially di¤erent in terms of skills, as long as their unobserved
permanent skills are di¤erent.
After computing the skill index for each individual i in each year t, we were able to
construct rm-level measures of workersand BOsskills. For each startup rm identied
in the data, we computed the average skill index of the workers hired at entry, as well as
the (average) skill index of the BO(s) founding the rm.10 The interpretation of this skill
measure is also intuitive, as it provides information on the average education level of workers
and BOs, adjusted in order to take into account the heterogeneity of individuals (in terms
of experience and unobserved permanent skill dimensions), even when we compare groups
of persons with the same education level.
3.3 Modeling human capital choices and deviations from bench-
marks
Studies concerned with sub-optimal entry positions and some kind of deviations from the
benchmark namely in startup size  normally use the average or the median choice of
the industry as benchmark (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch et al., 1999, 2000).
However, there is also a great heterogeneity at the rm and entrepreneur levels that may
make such deviations more likely for some rms/entrepreneurs than others. It is likely that
di¤erent entrepreneurs with di¤erent resources and skill levels enter with di¤erent human
resources. For this reason, simply comparing the decisions of each rm with those in the same
industry may be quite limited, by assigning the same benchmark to all startups entering in
the same industry in the same year.
In view of that, we use a new approach to rst estimate the startup size and the level of
skills that shall be used as benchmark for each rm, at each point in time over their lifecycle.
The estimation is based on a system of recursive simultaneous equations, where we allow
the key HR decisions at the rm-level to be jointly determined, and to be correlated with
10Given that the person-specic e¤ect is estimated based on individualsspells in wage employment, the
average skill index of the BO(s) was only possible to compute for those BOs with a record of at least two
years in paid employment.
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the human capital of the BOs and the ownership structure of the startup rm. The system
below summarizes the four equations of interest, which were estimated using data on all
active rms during the period 1992-2007 (i.e., both entrants and incumbents), in order to
take into account all the competition faced by the 17,579 startups rms in our sample.11
All equations include dummy variables for rm age (t), year (y), 2-digit industry (j),
and Nuts III region (r).
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Soloit = BOHC
0
it11 +BOExp
0
it12 + 13 Si zejt + 14WSkillsjt+
+ t + y + j + r + "1it
BOSkillsit = 21 Si zejt + 22WSkillsjt + 23BOSkillsjt + 24Soloit+
+ t + y + j + r + "2it
WSkillsit = BOExp
0
it31 + 32WSkillsjt + 33BOSkillsit+
+ t + y + j + r + "3it
Si zeit = BOExp
0
it41 + 42 Si zejt + 43WSkillsjt + 44Soloit+
+ 45BOSkillsit + t + y + j + r + "4it
(5)
The rst equation in the system corresponds to the decision of entering (or staying in) the
business alone or in a team. We expect this choice to be closely related to BOsgeneral and
specic human capital (measured by a set of variables in vectors BOHC and BOExp),
as well as to the size and quality of the workforce to be employed. However, as these two
last variables refer to endogenous choices in the system, and the equations must be designed
recursively, we use the average size and the average skill index of the workers employed by
rms operating in the same industry j and year t (Si zejt and WSkillsjt, respectively) as
exogenous proxies for the quantity and quality of HR to be hired by the rm.
As discussed above, the decision between running a business alone and sharing the
ownership with other(s) may have implications for the overall skill level of the entrepreneurial
team (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Forbes et al., 2006). In this sense, the skill level of the BOs is
no longer exogenous. It may be the result of some strategic combination of team members in
order to benet from several kinds of complementarities including skill complementarities.
Additionally, we also expect that entrepreneurs hiring a larger and more skilled workforce
at entry are more skilled on average. Again, these two variables cannot be introduced yet
as independent variables. Therefore, we include the average size and skills of the workers
employed by close competitors instead. Last but not least, we may expect that BOs might
want or need to be at least as skilled as their competitors, so we also include the average
11We have to restrict the analysis to rms whose BO(s) can be identied in QP les. We are able to
identify and track over time a total of 194,357 rms with known BO(s).
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BOsskill level of competitors (those in the same industry, in the same year) in the set of
independent variables of this second equation.
The nal equations of the system correspond to the quality and quantity of workers to
employ each year over rms lifecycle. From the above discussions, we expect a positive
association between workersand BOsskills, and also a strong inuence from competitors
human capital choices. The size of the workforce to be employed over rms lifecycles is
furthermore believed to be related to the average size of the rms operating in the same
industry, and to the decision of entering alone or in teams.
These inter-related entrepreneurial decisions were estimated using the method developed
by Roodman (2011). This forms the basis for the estimation of individual benchmarks for
human capital quantity and quality (and deviations therefrom). His technique extends
the logic of previous seemingly unrelated regression models by allowing the consistent and
e¢ cient estimation of fully observed recursive equation systems. This is relevant when
endogenous variables in the system inuence each other, as in our case. Besides, it allows
the combination of a broad panoply of models that were previously hard to estimate within
the same system of equations (e.g., probit models, linear regressions, truncated regressions).
This is also crucial in our case. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Insert Table 1 here
The estimation results indicate that older, more educated, and more experienced indi-
viduals (both in the industry and in management positions) tend to be more prone to start a
business alone. In contrast, a longer experience as a BO is apparently negatively associated
with the probability of entering alone, maybe because those who were entrepreneurs in the
past are more aware of the risks of founding a startup alone. The results in the rst column
also suggest a positive association between the average skill level of the workers employed by
competitors and the propensity of entering alone. This may suggest that solo entrepreneurs
in our sample are more risk-takers and more skilled on average than those entering in teams.
The results obtained for the second equation conrm that the level of skills exhibited
by BOs is signicantly and positively related to their decision of running the rm alone.
As expected, BOs skill levels are also positively aligned with the average skill level of
competitors in the same industry.
Finally, the results conrm the existence of a strong and positive relation between work-
ersand BOsskills (third equation). More skilled and more experienced BOs seem to hire
not only more skilled workers, but also larger workforces on average. Moreover, the quantity
(quality) of workers hired over rmslifecycle are found to be signicantly and positively
associated with the average quantity (quality) of workers employed by competitors in the
same industry.
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Having estimated the interrelated human capital decisions of startup rms through this
system of equations, we are now able to compute the so-called deviations from the benchmark
HR choices. This proceeds in two steps. First, based on the results of Table 1, we predict
the (correlated) quantity and quality of human capital to be employed at the moment of
entry, given a number of characteristics of rms and their BOs, the industry and the region
where the rm operates, as well as the macroeconomic environment, and the average choices
of the competitors operating in the same industry. Second, we measure the extent to which
each rm actually deviates from their close competitors (i.e., entrepreneurs with active rms
in the same year, region, and 2-digit industry, and with similar levels of general and specic
human capital, including the xed unobserved component), by calculating the percentage
di¤erence between each rms observed human capital inputs and the predicted values from
the above system of equations.
4 Deviations from human capital benchmarks and stick-
iness of entry choices
Table 2 provides summary statistics for various dimensions that characterize startup condi-
tions including the quantity and quality of HR at entry and that are expected to cor-
relate with the survival prospects of the rms under analysis. Given their di¤erent capital
intensity, we distinguish between startups in manufacturing and services. We furthermore
compare solo entrepreneurs with teams in each sector, as they may di¤er in their initial
capital constraints and, therefore, HR choices.
Insert Table 2 here
These statistics conrm that startups in services enter at a smaller scale than those
in manufacturing, and that solo entrepreneurs hire a smaller number of workers at entry
than teams. Workers hired at entry in services are more skilled on average than those
in manufacturing, and so are the entrepreneurs founding these rms. Solo entrepreneurs
and teams also di¤er in their average skill levels, with the former being more skilled on
average. Finally, BOs in manufacturing  and especially solo entrepreneurs  present a
longer industry-specic experience, while BOs in teams have more entrepreneurial experience
from previous businesses than those entering alone. All these di¤erences are statistically
signicant at the 1% level.
Though these rst statistics show that there is a great heterogeneity in startup condi-
tions, they are not informative about the extent to which these startups are matching or
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deviating from the benchmarks predicted for them in the previous section. Figure 1 illus-
trates the kernel density of deviations between rmsobserved startup size and the bench-
mark size predicted for them at entry, according to the estimations in Table 1. We nd
that most startups enter below the estimated startup size. Negative deviations are found to
be more severe in manufacturing industries, and especially among startups founded by solo
entrepreneurs, who may face larger nancial constraints, especially in these industries.
Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 2 illustrates the deviations from the predicted levels of workers skills at the
moment of entry. In this case, deviations are more moderate and centered at zero, and
di¤erences between solo entrepreneurs and teams are not so evident. However, we still nd
larger deviations in workersskills among rms established in services than in manufacturing
industries.
Insert Figure 2 here
Our data also suggest that entry decisions related to the quantity and quality of initial
human capital are rather sticky, as initial relative positions seem to be di¢ cult to change
afterwards. Table 3 reports the observed probabilities of moving along the distribution of
size and skill deviations during the rst three years of activity.
Insert Table 3 here
These statistics conrm that rms entering smaller than expected tend to remain below
the benchmark size in the long run. The great majority of rms whose startup size is smaller
than the estimated benchmark by more than 50% remain in the same deviating group three
years later. About 32% of them reduce this gap, but not enough to match or surpass the
estimated benchmark for size at that age.
A similar pattern is found for skill deviations. The bold values in the main diagonal
precisely show that there is a great share of rms staying in the same interval three years
later. Actually, most of the rms either stay in the same deviating interval, or move to
adjacent positions. This conrms that it is not easy to adjust the initial HR choices of
entrepreneurs. This persistence applies to all four sub-groups of rms described above.
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5 Deviations from human capital benchmarks and rm
survival
So far we have shown that initial HR decisions vary to a rather large extent across rms, even
if we look at a micro cosmos of rms operating in the same sector and region, founded in
the same year, and by BOs with similar levels of skills and experience. Moreover, deviations
from the expected levels of skills and numbers of employees are quite sticky over time.
Hence, initial HR decisions may have long term consequences. In this section, we assess to
what extent these initial decisions are related to rm survival.
We use duration models to study how deviations in the quantity and the quality of ini-
tial human capital may inuence rm survival. As our data come from an annual survey,
durations are grouped into yearly intervals. Those rms that are still operating at the end
of the period under observation are right-censored observations. This sampling plan is prop-
erly accommodated in the framework of discrete time duration models. We use a standard
semiparametric discrete time proportional hazard model and control for unobserved het-
erogeneity at the rm/BO-level by incorporating a Gamma-distributed multiplicative term
(Lancaster, 1990) in the hazard equation. Formally, the hazard rate of each rm i exiting
at discrete time tj, j = 1; 2; : : : ; given survival until then, may be written as follows:
hij = 1  expf  exp[(t) +Xi(t) + log("i)]g (6)
where (t) is a set of indicator variables for di¤erent duration intervals, thus exibly
describing the pattern of duration dependence in hazard rates, Xi(t) is a vector of variables
that are expected to be associated with rm survival,  is a vector of unknown parameters to
be estimated, and "i is the Gamma-distributed random term describing rm/BO unobserved
permanent heterogeneity.
Vector X includes the key variables of interest i.e., deviations from estimated bench-
marks for HR quantity and quality as well as a number of controls that may also inuence
rm survival, namely BOsspecic human capital measures, location in urban regions, and
a set of industry variables that are typically included in rm survival studies (concentra-
tion, minimum e¢ cient scale, industry employment growth rate, industry agglomeration,
and entry rates) (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 2002; Geroski et al., 2010).
5.1 Empirical results using linear spline regressions
We may expect that startups deviating negatively (positively) from the benchmark quan-
tity and quality of initial HR enter with a comparative disadvantage (advantage). However,
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imposing a linear relationship between size/skill deviations and rm hazard may be quite
limiting, especially if negative and positive deviations reect di¤erent, though random, con-
ditions. For this reason, the marginal e¤ects of positive and negative deviations are not
necessarily symmetric.
In view of that, we start by estimating linear spline regressions for the relationship
between deviations from benchmark size/skills at entry and rm hazard rate. As a starting
point, we impose the cut-o¤ (knot) to be at zero. This allows us to test whether the
estimated relationship has a di¤erent (linear) slope according to the sign of deviations.
Table 4 summarizes the results and compares the four groups of startups. The coe¢ -
cient of Size (Skill) deviations < 0% gives us the estimated slope for the (linear) relationship
between deviations from the benchmark size (skills) and hazard rate, for those rms enter-
ing below the benchmarks. Then, the coe¢ cient of Size/Skill deviations > 0% measures
the marginal change in the slope of that (linear) relationship for rms entering above the
benchmarks. Whenever this second coe¢ cient is statistically signicant, it means that the
relationship between size/skill deviations and rm hazard signicantly changes its slope at
the benchmark (i.e., at size/skill deviations=0)  so the marginal e¤ects of positive and
negative deviations are not symmetric.
Insert Table 4 here
Solo entrepreneurs entering in manufacturing industries at a scale smaller than the bench-
mark seem to su¤er signicant survival penalties. On the other hand, entering larger than
the benchmark size barely a¤ects their survival12 , but it signicantly improves the survival
of entrepreneurial teams in those industries. For startups in services, size deviations do
not seem to be signicantly related to rm exit risk. These results conrm the existence of
larger scale economies in manufacturing than in services, besides corroborating the so-called
liability of smallness (Brüderl et al., 1992; Mata and Portugal, 1994), which seems to be
particularly important for solo entrepreneurs in manufacturing.
The results obtained for skill deviations are rather mixed. Hiring a more skilled workforce
than expected is actually found to increase the exit risk of solo entrepreneurs operating in
services. This may suggest that they may be hiring over-qualied workers, which may result
in increased costs without a signicant increase in productivity  if we take into account
that most of these rms are either small shops for wholesale and retail trade, or restaurants,
cafes and bakeries (see Table A.I in the Appendix). However, for entrepreneurial teams,
we nd that the survival penalties may be quite severe for those entering with an initial
12For positive deviations, the slope of the linear relationship is still negative, but close to zero:  1:0641+
0:9704 =  0:0937:
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workforce whose skill level is below the estimated benchmark, both in manufacturing and
services.
5.2 Non-linear e¤ects of deviations from human capital bench-
marks
The previous results conrmed that positive and negative deviations from HR benchmarks
are not symmetrically associated with rm hazard. However, the cut-o¤ point at zero was
somehow ad-hoc imposed, relying on the assumption that the estimated benchmarks for
startup size and initial workers skills correspond to the optimal values. As previously
discussed, this may actually not be the case. Furthermore, the relationship between human
capital deviations and exit rate may be non-linear. For these reasons, we estimate alternative
specications using a quadratic approximation for the relationship between human capital
deviations and rm hazards. Table 5 summarizes the results.
Insert Table 5 here
These specications indicate that there is a non-linear quadratic association between
size deviations and rm hazard in manufacturing. A non-linear relationship between skill
deviations and exit rates is also found for startups established in services. However, in both
cases, the shape of the relationship di¤ers according to the ownership structure at entry
(solo entrepreneurs versus teams). Also, the inexion point is not necessarily at zero, which
indicates that the benchmark for startup size and workersskills at entry may not be optimal
at least for rm survival.
Given that the non-linear relationship between human capital deviations and new ven-
tures exit may not be really quadratic, we further extend our analysis by following a more
exible approach that allows us to nd out the parametric function of size and skill devia-
tions that better ts our data. The method is proposed by Royston and Sauerbrei (2007)
and it is based on multivariable regression spline models. Their algorithm automatically
selects the regression spline model (which is not necessarily linear) and the respective knots
position that best predicts the outcome variable from each independent variable. We use
it as a nal check for the estimated relationships between deviations from human capital
benchmarks and new ventures exit risk.
5.3 Multivariate spline model with cubic regression splines
We estimate the Royston and Sauerbreis multivariable regression spline model for survival
time data, separately for the four groups of startups under analysis. We then produce the
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estimated values and the respective condence intervals for each group. Figure 3 presents the
results obtained for deviations from benchmark startup size. Figure 4 provides comparable
gures for the relationship between deviations from benchmark workforce skills and the log
of relative hazards.13
The results conrm the non-linear association between size deviations and rm hazards
in manufacturing. Consistent with the previous results, we nd that solo entrepreneurs
in these industries su¤er higher hazards if they enter below the estimated benchmark for
startup size. This is in line with prior studies suggesting that rms not achieving the so-
called minimum e¢ cient scale which is the common benchmark for rm size face higher
exit rates (e.g., Audretsch and Acs, 1990; Mata and Portugal, 2002).
Insert Figure 3 here
Our results further show that rms entering manufacturing industries at a larger scale
than the benchmark can still reduce their exit risk comparatively to those entering at the
predicted benchmark size (i.e., with deviations from predicted startup size equal to zero).
This indicates that manufacturing startups in our sample are, on average, entering at sub-
optimal scales. Whether or not this is a common pattern among startups in manufacturing
industries is a topic that deserves further research, using data for other countries.
For solo entrepreneurs in services, we do not nd any statistically signicant association
between size deviations and exit risk. Given the micro-sized nature of these startup rms
and the industries where they tend to be concentrated, di¤erences of one or two workers
often correspond to great percentage deviations from the estimated benchmark, which in
practice do not seem to a¤ect the survival prospects of these businesses.14 For teams, the
model instead nds a linear negative association between size deviations and rm hazards,
suggesting that entering below (above) the benchmark startup size results in signicant
survival penalties (gains).
Regarding deviations from the benchmark workforce skills at the moment of entry, the
results conrm the mixed evidence already documented in the previous sections. A more
skilled workforce seems to increase the exit risk for startups in services, especially those
founded by solo entrepreneurs.15 First, contrary to manufacturing industries, there might
13We do not present the estimation results because they are not so informative and easy to interpret
as the plots obtained after estimations, given the large number of knots and the existence on non-linear
relationships linking some of the knots.
14Given the heterogeneity in services, we rerun our estimations separately for the sectors 61-63 (Wholesale
Trade, Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels) and for the remaining services startups. The pattern illustrated
in Figure 3 for solo entrepreneurs in services mainly reects the results found for sectors 61-63. For solo
entrepreneurs in other services, we nd a more similar pattern to that found for manufacturing industries.
The separate gures for these two groups of services industries are available from the authors upon request.
15We found no great di¤erence between solo and teams in sectors 61-63 and those entering other services.
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be no productivity gains by hiring such a highly skilled workforce in these sectors. Second,
for solo entrepreneurs in particular who may be more nancially constrained than teams,
on average it may result in higher costs (namely a higher wage bill) that also reduce the
viability of their business.
Insert Figure 4 here
For teams, however, we nd that entering with a less skilled workforce may result in
considerable survival penalties. Actually, the results further indicate that deviating above
the estimated benchmark for workersskills may still reduce their hazard up to a certain
point. This may suggest that entrepreneurial teams in our data enter with sub-optimal levels
of workersquality compared to their close competitors they can reduce their hazards by
entering with a workforce more skilled than the benchmark. Given that, on average, they
are less skilled than solo entrepreneurs, and that skill complementarities may be achieved
between entrepreneurs and workers (e.g., Baptista et al., 2013), they become subject to
larger survival penalties when they enter with a less qualied workforce. In summary, these
di¤erent results found for deviations in human capital quality among solo entrepreneurs and
teams may mostly reect the heterogeneity in BOsquality, more than di¤erent ownership
structures per se. Random deviations from the benchmark workforce quality may have
di¤erent implications according to the quality of entrepreneurs themselves.
As a nal robustness check, we repeated the analysis for i) the subsample of startups
that never change their BOs under the period under analysis, and for ii) the same sample
used above, but without imposing the right-censoring at the point of ownership change (i.e.,
also including the spells under the ownership of a new entrepreneur or a new team). The
estimated relationships between size/skill deviations and rm hazard remained consistent
with the patterns illustrated above in Figures 3 and 4. All these additional results may be
available upon request.
6 Concluding Remarks
Despite the many discussions about comparative advantages in key resources (including
HR), it is hard to nd thorough analyses on the role of (relative) positions of startup rms
in terms of the quantity and quality of their personnel, and the implications of deviating
from benchmarks. We study the survival implications of startups relative positions in
the quantity and quality of human resources at entry, taking into account the correlation
between hiring decisions at entry and founders human capital. Our analysis compares
startups in industries with very di¤erent entry barriers and capital requirements. Firms
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founded by solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams are furthermore compared, given
their potential di¤erences regarding nancial constraints and BOshuman capital levels.
Our results suggest that deviations from benchmark startup size may be particularly
relevant in manufacturing industries, where economies of scale may be of greater importance.
We nd that many startups enter at sub-optimal scales, and that such inferior positions
result in large survival penalties. In view of that, sub-optimal entry strategies based on the
intention to learn about the rm itself and the market may be really costly, especially for
solo entrepreneurs entering more capital-intensive industries.
In services, our results point out that there might be some risk of hiring overqualied
workers, though it seems to be somewhat conditional on the skill levels of entrepreneurs
themselves. Contrary to manufacturing industries, there might be no great productivity
gains from entering with a highly skilled workforce in services, especially if the industry is
not so knowledge-intensive. It may, instead, result in higher costs or even labor turnover later
on, which reduces the sustainability of the business. This result deserves further research.
Our analysis also conrms that relative positions at entry are quite di¢ cult to change
during the rst years of activity in the market, which imply that wrong initial choices might
turn out to be a close to irreversible matter, with large penalties for survival. The evidence
we nd may o¤er insights and implications for both policy makers and entrepreneurs. By
conrming the importance of certain relative positions at the moment of entry and the po-
tential stickiness of initial HR choices, this paper reinforces the need for policies targeting
entrepreneurs and newborn rms at a very early stage. Policy intervention aiming at re-
ducing forecasting errors, information asymmetries, or entrepreneursability and nancial
constraints seem to be of high value.
For prospective entrepreneurs, a similar caveat applies. Given the di¢ culty in reversing
some initial decisions and the likely survival penalties associated with certain inferior and
superior positions at the moment of startup, new and forthcoming BOs are encouraged
to balance the potential e¤ects of (un)intended deviations relative to closer competitors
choices when they decide to enter the market.
Further research on these questions, using comparable data for other countries with
di¤erent labor market rigidities and di¤erent proles of entrepreneurs, will be certainly
appreciated by scholars, policy makers, and practitioners.
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Recursive mixed-process model for entrepreneurs’ key HR decisions 
(All firms, entrants and incumbents, 1992-2007, Portugal) 
  
Solo 
entrepreneur 
BOs’  
skills 
Workers’  
skills 
Workforce 
size 
BOs’ age 0.0325*** 
   
 
(0.0002) 
   
BOs’ education 0.1101*** 
   
 
(0.0004) 
   
BOs’ industry-specific (2d) experience 0.0019*** 
 
0.0132*** 0.1045*** 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0014) (0.0079) 
BOs’ entrepreneurial experience -0.0119*** 
 
0.0211*** 0.2495*** 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0026) (0.0156) 
BOs’ experience in management positions 0.0458*** 
 
0.0089*** 0.2103*** 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0029) (0.0164) 
Average firm size in the same industry (2d) -0.0048 0.0197 
 
0.8824*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0127) 
 
(0.0445) 
Average workers’ skill in the same industry (2d)  0.0427*** 0.0374 0.6157*** -0.4771* 
 
(0.0193) (0.0655) (0.0351) (0.2557) 
Average BOs’ skills in the same industry (2d)  
 
0.7370*** 
  
  
(0.0357) 
  
Solo entrepreneur 
 
4.9312*** 
 
-3.3677*** 
  
(0.0117) 
 
(1.1431) 
BOs’ skills 
  
0.2688*** 0.4847** 
      (0.0029) (0.2306) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (2d) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region (Nuts III) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 488,302 
Log  likelihood 2,740,379.7 
Notes: ***, **, and *, mean statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
The estimation was performed with the cmp command written for Stata by Roodman (2011). The first equation corresponds to a probit 
model for the binary decision of entering/staying alone as a BO, or sharing the ownership of the firm with other(s). The last equation for 
workforce size was estimated with a truncated regression, given the lower bound of 1 employee in our dataset.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (Portugal, startups entering during the period 1992-2007, excluding 2001) 
 
 
All  
startups 
Solo 
entrepreneurs 
Manufacturing 
Solo 
entrepreneurs 
Services 
Entrepreneurial 
teams 
Manufacturing 
Entrepreneurial 
 teams  
Services 
Initial workforce size (nr. employees) 4.425 5.370 3.094 7.764 4.944 
 
(4.011) (5.595) (2.055) (7.000) (3.219) 
Initial workforce skills (average skill index) 6.283 5.628 6.483 5.677 6.426 
 
(2.022) (1.698) (2.144) (1.544) (1.994) 
BOs’ skills (average skill index) 8.055 7.294 8.513 7.081 7.978 
 
(2.754) (2.646) (2.910) (2.234) (2.551) 
BOs’ industry-specific (2d) experience (years) 2.107 3.498 1.936 2.666 1.671 
 
(2.890) (3.607) (2.935) (2.754) (2.342) 
BOs’ entrepreneurial experience (years) 1.365 1.257 1.255 1.563 1.503 
 
(1.142) (1.134) (1.059) (1.260) (1.199) 
BOs’ management experience (years) 1.231 1.046 1.284 1.131 1.254 
 
(1.590) (1.535) (1.741) (1.282) (1.456) 
Number of firms 17,579 2,021 8,180 1,826 5,552 
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the entry year. Values in parentheses correspond to standard deviations.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Transition probability matrix for size and skill deviations three years after entry (all startups, 1992-2007)
a
 
  
Deviations from the size benchmark 3 years after entryb 
    [-100%, -50%[ [-50%, -10%[ [-10%,10%] ]10%,50%] ]50%,100%] >100% 
Deviations 
from the size 
benchmark 
at entry 
[-100%, -50%[ 57.8% 31.5% 4.6% 3.0% 1.5% 1.6% 
[-50%, -10%[ 23.7% 48.5% 12.2% 8.9% 3.6% 3.1% 
[-10%,10%] 7.9% 36.4% 19.6% 19.1% 10.6% 6.4% 
]10%,50%] 4.8% 22.2% 18.1% 26.8% 15.1% 13.0% 
]50%,100%] 2.9% 12.4% 9.6% 23.5% 20.8% 30.8% 
>100% 1.7% 4.4% 5.1% 9.6% 14.1% 65.1% 
  Deviations from the workers’ skills benchmark 3 years after entryb 
    [-100%, -50%[ [-50%, -10%[ [-10%,10%] ]10%,50%] ]50%,100%] >100% 
Deviations 
from the 
workers’ 
skills 
benchmark 
at entry 
[-100%, -50%[ 28.8% 55.2% 10.4% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
[-50%, -10%[ 1.3% 58.9% 27.7% 11.3% 0.8% 0.1% 
[-10%,10%] 0.3% 20.9% 54.5% 23.4% 0.8% 0.0% 
]10%,50%] 0.1% 9.8% 26.5% 60.4% 3.2% 0.1% 
]50%,100%] 0.0% 4.6% 12.9% 42.7% 37.4% 2.5% 
>100% 0.0% 11.8% 23.5% 23.5% 5.9% 35.3% 
a Only for firms that survived at least 3 years. Each row sums 100%. b Deviations from the predicted size/skills three years after entry are 
computed as the percentage difference between each firm observed size/skills and the estimated size/skill benchmark at the third year of 
activity. The benchmarks for size/skills three years after entry were obtained from the recursive system of equations reported in Table 1.  
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Table 4. Discrete-time hazard models with linear splines for deviations from benchmark size and skills 
(knots at zero) 
  
SOLO  
Manufacturing 
SOLO  
Services 
TEAMS  
Manufacturing 
TEAMS   
Services 
Size deviations < 0% -1.0641*** 0.1279 -0.0608 -0.3638 
 
(0.1057) (0.1600) (0.1875) (0.2722) 
Size deviations > 0% 0.9704*** -0.1661 -0.6103*** 0.4486 
 
(0.1215) (0.1649) (0.2193) (0.2757) 
Skill deviations < 0% -0.1753 0.3992 -1.4641** -1.2121** 
 
(0.3402) (0.3287) (0.6060) (0.5185) 
Skill deviations > 0% -0.2300 0.5300** 1.2964*** 0.6373 
  (0.2573) (0.2617) (0.4607) (0.4138) 
Number of observations 6,749 27,316 5,633 15,543 
Log likelihood -4,048.4 -10,046.8 -2,414.2 -6,734.0 
*, **, and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. All the 
specifications control for startup size, average workers’ skills at entry, founders’ skill index and specific human capital measures (2-digit 
industry experience, entrepreneurial experience, management experience), an indicator variable for firms established in urban areas 
(Porto or Lisbon), a set of 2-digit industry-level variables (HH index, minimum efficient scale, industry annual growth in terms of 
employment, industry agglomeration, and entry rate), year dummies, and duration dummies.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Discrete-time hazard models with a non-linear relationship between deviations from human capital 
benchmarks and firm hazard 
  
SOLO  
Manufacturing 
SOLO  
Services 
TEAMS  
Manufacturing 
TEAMS  
Services 
Size deviations -0.6380*** -0.0172 -0.3498** -0.5366*** 
 
(0.0665) (0.0795) (0.1535) (0.1119) 
Size deviations squared 0.2309*** -0.0050 -0.1667*** 0.0884 
 
(0.0286) (0.0314) (0.0608) (0.0508) 
Skill deviations -0.2885 0.5616* -0.8224 -0.4021 
 
(0.3089) (0.2882) (0.5545) (0.2621) 
Skill deviations squared -0.1539 0.4323** 0.4543 0.7143*** 
  (0.1871) (0.1699) (0.3385) (0.1235) 
Number of observations 6,749 27,316 5,633 15,543 
Log likelihood -4,050.3 -16,403.1 -2,416.5 -6,725.3 
*, **, and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. All the 
specifications include the same controls as in Table 4.  
 
 
27 
 
FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1. Deviations from benchmark startup size 
 
 
Fig. 2. Deviations from benchmark workforce skills at entry 
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Fig. 3. Estimated relationship between deviations from benchmark startup size and log (relative hazards), by 
groups of startups (grey lines are 95% pointwise confidence intervals) 
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Fig. 4. Estimated relationship between deviations from benchmark workers’ skills at entry and log (relative 
hazards), by groups of startups (grey lines are 95% pointwise confidence intervals) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.I. Distribution of startups by industries 
Manufacturing: 
Solo 
Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial 
Teams 
(31) Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco 10.0% 11.7% 
(32) Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 37.4% 27.5% 
(33) Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture 7.2% 7.9% 
(34) Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 7.2% 7.6% 
(35) Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 2.5% 2.4% 
(36) Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal 5.9% 7.0% 
(37) Basic Metal Industries 0.4% 0.9% 
(38) Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 23.4% 26.9% 
(39) Other Manufacturing Industries 6.1% 8.1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Total number of startups 2,021 1,826 
Services:  
Solo 
Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial 
Teams 
(61) Wholesale Trade 14.8% 19.2% 
(62) Retail Trade 31.7% 28.6% 
(63) Restaurants and Hotels 22.1% 20.2% 
(71) Transport and Storage 5.3% 5.8% 
(72) Communication 0.3% 0.3% 
(81) Financial Institutions 0.7% 0.7% 
(82) Insurance 0.3% 0.3% 
(83) Real State and Business Services 17.6% 17.6% 
(91) Public Administration and Defense 3.4% 3.6% 
(92) Sanitary and Similar Services 0.3% 0.3% 
(93) Social and Related Community Services 0.7% 0.7% 
(94) Recreational and Cultural Services 0.7% 0.9% 
(95) Personal and Household Services 2.2% 2.0% 
Total 100% 100% 
Total number of startups 8,180 5,552 
 
 
